Indexing mergers and acquisitions by Gang, Jianhua et al.
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gang, J., Guo, J. (M.), Hu, N. and Li, X. (2018) Indexing mergers and 
acquisitions. Quantitative Finance, 18(6), pp. 1033-1048. 
(doi:10.1080/14697688.2017.1369145) 
 
 
There may be differences between this version and the published version. 
You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from 
it.  
 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/148884/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deposited on: 02 October 2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enlighten – Research publications by members of the University of Glasgow 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk  
 
1 
 
Indexing Mergers and Acquisitions 
 
Jianhua Gang a, Jie (Michael) Guob*, Nan Huc and Xi Lib 
a China Financial Policy Research Centre, School of Finance, Renmin University of China, 
Beijing, China, Email: jhgang@ruc.edu.cn  
b University of Durham, Durham Business School, Mill Hill Lane, DH1 3LB, Durham UK, Email: 
jie.guo@durham.ac.uk; xi.li@durham.ac.uk *Corresponding Author: Jie Michael Guo 
b Glasgow University, Adam Smith Business School, University Lane, Glasgow G12 8QQ, UK, 
Email: nan.hu@glasgow.ac.uk 
 
Abstract 
We measure the efficiency of mergers and acquisitions by putting forward an index (the “M&A Index”) 
based on the stochastic frontier analysis. The M&A Index is calculated for each takeover deal and 
standardized between 0 and 1. The acquisition with a higher index encompasses higher efficiency. We 
find that takeover bids with higher M&A Indices are more likely to succeed. Moreover, M&A Index 
shows a strong and positive relation with acquirers’ post-acquisition stock performance in the short-run 
and operating performance in the long run. After constructing three portfolios under a buy-and-hold 
strategy, we find that efficient portfolios with the highest indices earn higher equity returns and monthly 
alphas than inefficient portfolios with the lowest indices. Overall, our findings indicate that the M&A 
Index is positively associated with merger outcomes for acquirers. 
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1. Introduction 
Does an acquirer efficiently take over the target? Does the efficiency of acquisition 
imply significant post-acquisition performance in the short-run or the long-run? 
Questions as such have strong economic and trading implications. However, past 
literature presents little evidence on takeover efficiency and its potential relationship 
with merger outcomes 1 . The majority of M&A literature concentrates on partial 
acquisition issues2 but lacks overall evaluations of takeover activities. In this paper, we 
redefine the concept of takeover efficiency3 and build a composite index, the M&A 
Index, in order to provide a comprehensive understanding of takeover quality4.  
The composite index is superior to consolidate and simplify information from a 
complex process, especially when researchers are to standardize diverse empirical 
results so as to make comparisons. Therefore, indexing economic behavior attracts 
more and more public attention and interest (Sharpe, 2004). In the field of corporate 
finance, composite indicators are increasingly recognized and adopted. For example, 
the KZ Index is constructed to measure financial situations (Kaplan and Zingales, 
1997), and Governance Index (Gompers et al., 2003) and Entrenchment index 
(Bebchuk et al., 2009) are to evaluate corporate governance. Both of the concepts of 
the financial situation and corporate governance are subjective, abstract and 
multi-dimensional. Researchers often need a basket of various financial ratios and 
descriptions so as to capture their ideas of the general conditions.  Hence, it is 
practically important to build a standardized and meaningful indicator to make it easier 
to measure these issues quantitatively so as to be investigated in econometric models 
as a variable. 
In general, as one of the largest corporate investments, M&A tends to exert strong and 
                                                      
1 Merger outcomes include takeover deal completion, acquisition premium, and post-acquisition stock performance. 
2 Previous literatures on mergers and acquisitions segregate takeover process and investigate each segment and its determinant 
respectively (such as the probability of deal completion; bid premium; post-acquisition performance during announcement period 
or stock performance in the long-run). 
3 “Efficiency” in recent M&A studies refers to the “efficiency gain” --- acquirers’/ targets’ announcement returns, which are 
whether acquisition partner earn abnormal return during announcement period. In this paper, however, efficiency is related with 
whole takeover process and used to measure the overall acquisition quality. 
4 Tehranian et al. (2013) illustrate that acquisition with high quality is the deal when bidding firms earn higher announcement 
return, pay less premium and have higher trading volume. 
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long-lasting influence on firms’ operating and financial performance.  Recent M&A 
literature lacks comprehensive evaluation for takeover activities. Previous studies 
mainly concentrate on the relation between merger outcomes and single or multiple 
factors of deal characteristic and corporate fundamentals. However, the impact of each 
determinant on post-acquisition performance is inconsistent due to the complication of 
the takeover. Therefore, a composite indicator, which can accurately gauge the overall 
takeover quality, is needed to re-evaluate and forecast financial consequences of 
acquisitions effectively. To our knowledge, we are the first to fill the research gap and 
hence enrich literature in M&A field. 
We start M&A-indexing by firstly introducing the concept of “takeover efficiency” to 
assess the overall takeover quality5. Specifically, a deal is regard “efficient” if and only 
if acquisition could maximize the acquirer’s gain6 when announced to the public. In a 
market of strong-form efficiency (Fama, 1965), the stock movement on 
announcement day reflects market reaction and expectation to the takeover 
transaction. Higher announcement return indicates that the market is more optimistic 
towards the deal. In this study, we compare the acquirers’ observed announcement 
return with the hypothetically maximum return to gauge the takeover efficiency. 
Ideally, the acquisition is an efficient strategy for acquirers to develop and expand 
their business. Previous findings confirm that acquiring firms could benefit from 
synergy gain, including financial and operational improvement (Devos et al., 2009; 
Houston et al., 2001; Hoberg and Phillips, 2010). Therefore, acquirers should have 
gotten good feedback from the market. The announcement return in ideal acquisitions 
is the optimal and maximized return of bidders. However, the actual announcement 
return is less than the optimal gain due to various inefficiencies, including agency 
                                                      
5 Tehranian et al. (2013) illustrate that acquisition with high quality is the deal when bidding firms earn higher announcement  
return, pay less premium and have higher trading volume. Herein, we adjust the standards for good quality acquisition and relate 
the deal quality with takeover efficiency. 
6 We construct M&A index with acquirers’ stock performance rather than combined firms’ stocks because acquirers generally 
have much larger firm-size than targets. The value-weighted announcement returns for combined firms are heavily affected by 
acquirer’s stock performance on announcement day. Moreover, the post-acquisition performance in the long-run is mainly 
determined by bidding firms since acquirers take control of targets. 
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problems in acquirers and resistance from targets’ management, etc7 . Takeover 
efficiency is then used to estimate the gap between the actual and optimal 
announcement returns. Higher efficiency indicates that the actual announcement 
return is closer to the optimal market reaction, implying that acquirers can gain better 
post-acquisition performance. Accordingly, the M&A Index8 is developed to directly 
and quantitatively scoring the degree of takeover efficiency for each deal. By design, 
the M&A Index is forward-looking and predicts merger outcomes, including the 
probability of deal completion, announcement return in the short run and 
post-acquisition operating performance in the long run. 
To construct the M&A Index, we adopt the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) 
approach9. In this paper, the SFA is implemented to measure the deviation from 
optimal market reaction to acquirers’ takeover announcement. Hence, the SFA 
provides a benchmark of takeover efficiency. Specifically, the acquirer’s return is 
examined as an output of SFA to quantify acquisition impact. Market optimism 
towards the deal would realize high announcement return for acquirers (positive 
impact). Inputs of the M&A Index include pre-bid characteristics of acquisition 
partners (bidders and targets) and the information revealed on the announcement day. 
Due to data availability, we only consider public acquisitions in which both acquirers 
and targets are public firms. Strong-form market efficiency is assumed, so that all 
public and private information regarding the deal is reflected in the stock price on the 
announcement day. 
In essence, the M&A Index is the technical efficiency10 of stochastic frontier models 
and is computed as a ratio of the actual acquirer’s return against optimal return on the 
announcement day. The optimal announcement return represents a maximum feasible 
announcement return that a bidder could reach by assuming the absence of inefficiency 
                                                      
7 Take an analogy, pasta is delicious and can be scored at 10 (optimal). The score of pasta will be lower, say 7 if too much salt is 
added or the pasta is overly boiled. “Pasta” the dish is takeover. “Too much salt” and “overly boiled” is the inefficiency. 
8 In the subsample with Entrenment index (Bebchuk et al., 2009), we find that M&A index are negatively related with 
entrenchment index (agency cost problem) and premium paid by acquirer (overpayment), indicating acquirer agency problem 
and overpayment reduce the M&A index. The choice of cash payment increase the M&A index. The findings indicate that the 
M&A index could reflect and capture the takeover effieicency.    
9 See Aigner et al., 1977; Meeusen and van denk Broeck, 1977. 
10 Technical efficiency in SFA is measured as firm’s actual output over maximum output value.   
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factors. The value of the M&A Index ranges from 0 to 111. A higher value indicates a 
smaller disparity between the actual and optimal announcement returns, and it, 
therefore, implies a better takeover quality. 
Empirical results show that the M&A Index can be regarded as a measurement of 
takeover efficiency, and it provides forecasts of the post-acquisition performance. We 
find that the M&A Index positively correlates with the completion rate, signaling 
deals with higher indices are more likely to be successful. Additionally, deals with 
higher M&A Indices tend to have better post-acquisition stock performance in the 
short run and better operating performance in the long run, and this is statistically 
significant at 1% significance level. 
Furthermore, we develop a buy-and-hold trading strategy based on the M&A Index 
over the post-acquisition period. We construct three different portfolios: Portfolio 1 
with the least efficient deals (lowest indices); Portfolio 2 with the deals of moderate 
efficiency; Portfolio 3 with the most efficient deals (highest indices). Results show 
that acquirers in the highest quantile of the M&A Index (Portfolio 3) earn much higher 
returns and monthly alphas than the ones in lowest quantile (Portfolio 1). This superior 
performance is significant and also robust to different asset pricing models12. On 
average, the portfolio with most-efficient deals (Portfolio 3) earns 7% higher than the 
portfolio with least-efficient transactions (Portfolio 1) for one to six-month holding 
periods. Monthly alpha of Portfolio 3 also dominates Portfolio1 by 9.08% for a 
holding period of one month. And the persistence of this pattern proves to be 
statistically significant at 1% significance level. 
To our knowledge, this paper is the first to develop a methodology to score the 
efficiency for takeovers. The M&A Index may also be used to forecast merger 
                                                      
11 Stochastic frontier analysis assumes that optimal output is the maximum value that a firm could realize. The actual output is 
less than optimal output. The technical efficiency 
𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡
𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡
 is therefore less than 1. In this paper, we also assume that 
acquirers ’optimal announcement return is larger than the actual announcement return. Therefore, M&A Index which equals 
to
𝑎𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑠′𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛
𝑎𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑠′𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛
, is limited to 1.   
12 We employ four asset pricing models to estimate monthly alpha, including CAPM model, Fama-French 3 factors model, 
Fama-French 4 factors model and Fama-French 5 factors.  
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outcomes, and thereby financial practitioners can evaluate acquisitions in a much 
simpler way, and researchers can treat the M&A Index as a factor in measuring the 
impact of acquisitions in asset pricing models. 
The contribution of this paper is four-folded. First, this paper introduces an effective 
and forward-looking composite index of the M&A quality. Second, this paper provides 
an alternative indicator for market reaction to acquisition announcement which is 
proved to be efficient. Third, this paper implements the stochastic frontier analysis 
(SFA) in the M&A field, which enriches the application of SFA in event studies. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents our hypothesis; Section 3 
describes the methodology and variables to construct the M&A Index; Section 4 
describes the dataset and the M&A Indices; Section 5 reports empirical results and the 
corresponding interpretations; Section 6 presents robustness check for our findings; 
Section 7 concludes the paper. 
2. Hypothesis 
Luo (2005) illustrates that the probability of deal completion is affected by market 
reaction to takeover announcement since managements of acquiring firms learn from 
market to determine whether to consummate takeover transactions. The M&A index by 
design may be regarded as an alternative indicator for market perspective to announced 
deal because it is a ratio of actual acquirer announcement return to the optimal return on 
the announcement day. The announcement return is the market response to an 
acquisition deal immediately after the public release. The optimal announcement return 
is the highest level that a bidder could reach if the takeover is completely efficient. A 
higher ratio indicates that the acquisition is close to an efficient deal and therefore has a 
better takeover quality. It is likely that acquiring firms would be motivated to complete 
the deal if market appraisal were to be significant. Therefore, we propose the following 
hypotheses: 
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H1: Higher values of the index (of a bidding firm) indicate a higher probability of deal 
completion. 
Olson and Pagano (2005) illustrate that short-term stock reaction reflects the investors’ 
expectation of takeover deals. Therefore, acquisition partners would benefit from 
higher stock return if investors have better reaction and expectation for takeover 
transactions. M&A index measures the shortfall between actual acquirers’ return and 
optimal return at the announcement, which shows a market response to an acquisition 
attempt. A higher index implies that the market positively responds to the acquisition. 
Therefore, more efficient deal (with higher index) is expected to have better stock 
performance in the short run. Hence, we assume: 
H2: Acquirers with higher M&A indices earn more cumulative abnormal return than the firms 
with lower indices in the short term after the acquisition. 
Andrade et al. (2001) indicate that post-merger operating performance reflects whether 
acquirers eventually obtain expected gain at the announcement. Therefore, long-run 
operating performance signifies the takeover quality and synergy gain to acquirers. 
Deals with higher M&A Indices represent that market participants are more optimistic 
towards merger outcomes. Therefore, more efficient deals are expected to generate 
more synergy gain in the acquisition, which would be realized in the form of 
post-merger profitability. Higher M&A index implies better long-run operating 
performance. Therefore, we assume: 
H3: M&A Indices are positively related to the post-merger operating performance in the long 
run. 
3. Methodology 
3.1 The M&A index 
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3.1.1 Takeover efficiency and acquirers’ announcement return 
In an efficient market, security price would adjust fully and immediately after the 
information is released. Therefore, acquirers’ stock13 on the announcement day would 
reflect the market reaction and expectation to the takeover bids. Higher acquirers’ 
return at announcement suggests that market is more optimistic towards the merger 
outcomes, including the probability of deal completion and the post-acquisition 
performance. 
Ideally, takeover is an efficient investment strategy for acquirers to grow the business 
and enhance competitiveness. Acquirers could benefit from synergy gain, including 
financial and operational improvement (Devos et al., 2009; Houston et al., 2001; 
Hoberg and Phillips, 2010). Hence, acquirers should have received good market 
reaction to the takeover announcements. The return gained in the ideal takeover 
transactions is the optimal announcement return for bidding firms. However, the 
observed stock return is not as large as optimal announcement return since market 
anticipation would be reduced by the concern of acquirers’ agency cost, such as CEO 
hubris problem, motivation of empire-building, resistance from targets’ management 
and overpayment for the target. A smaller difference between the actual and optimal 
announcement returns indicates fewer agency problems in takeover deals and therefore 
implies a better merger quality. 
In this paper, we define the takeover efficiency as that acquisition maximizes the 
acquirers’ announcement return. Higher-efficiency deals often suggest smaller 
deviation of actual acquirers’ return from the optimal stock performance. Hence, they 
imply less agency cost and better takeover qualities. 
                                                      
13 We construct M&A index with acquirers’ stock performance rather than combined firms’ stocks because acquirers generally 
have much larger firm-size than targets. On average, acquirer’ firm-size is 32.9044 times larger than targets’ in the full sample. 
The value-weighted returns of combined firms are strongly affected by acquirers’ announcement return. Additionally, we limit 
the takeover sample to the deals in which acquirers take control of target after acquisition.  
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3.1.2 Constructing a benchmark for takeover efficiency 
To estimate the takeover efficiency, we employ the production function in the 
stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) (Aigner et al., 1977; Meeusen and Broeck, 1977). 
SFA is a parametric approach used to measure the firms’ ability to maximize the output 
given a set of input (production function) or minimize the cost given a set of output 
(cost function). In this study, takeover efficiency is the technical efficiency of the 
production function and is computed as a ratio of acquirers’ observed return to the 
optimal level at the announcement. We start with production function and adopt the 
acquirers’ return on announcement day 𝐴𝐶𝑄_𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖 as the output. To measure the 
acquisition impact, we adjust the observed acquirers’ return 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖 at date announced 
from CRSP database with hypothetical return 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡), which is estimated with market 
model (Brown and Warner, 1985) and acquirers’ stock information prior to the 
announcement. 
 𝐴𝐶𝑄_𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖 =  
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖
𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡)
          (1) 
𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝜉𝑖                        (2) 
Where  𝐴𝐶𝑄_𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖 measures the acquirer’s announcement return of the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ firm.  𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖  is observed 
return for 𝑖𝑡ℎfirm on the date announced from CRSP.  𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡) is the expectation of return calculated by 
the market model (Brown and Warner, 1985). 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the rate of return for the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ firm on day t from 
CRSP, 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the market value-weighted excess return on day t from CRSP.  
Herein, 𝐴𝐶𝑄_𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖
14, the output of production frontier, is computed as a ratio of the 
acquirer’s return on announcement day 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖 over the predicted return 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡). The 
predicted return is calculated by the market model (Brown and Warner, 1985) with 
estimation period starting from 200 trading days to 20 trading days before the 
announcement day. We then regress firm’s daily return on value-weighted market 
                                                      
14 The reason why we do not use abnormal return (difference between actual return and the return predicted by asset pricing 
model) is that SFA requires the log transformation of output. Therefore, output is limited to positive value. To include more 
takeover transactions, we use the ratio of actual announcement return over predicted return instead of abnormal return.  
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return over estimation period to obtain coefficients. Finally, we get estimated return 
𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡) by using the coefficients and market return at announcement day. 
The original production function for takeover efficiency can be estimated as follows: 
 𝐴𝐶𝑄_𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖 = 𝑓(X𝑖 , 𝛽) exp(𝜀𝑖)                       (3) 
𝜀𝑖 = 𝑣𝑖 − 𝜇𝑖                   (4) 
where  𝐴𝐶𝑄_𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖 measures the acquirer’s announcement return of the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ firm. 𝑋𝑖  is an input 
vector which affects the acquirer’s return. 𝛽  is a vector of the estimated coefficients.  𝜀𝑖  is a 
composite error component. 𝑣𝑖  is the idiosyncratic component for the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ deal, 𝑢𝑖  is the 
inefficiency in the 𝑖𝑡ℎdeal. 
Different with conventional econometric method, SFA decomposes error term 𝜀𝑖 into 
two components, a random error 𝑣𝑖  and deviation from the optimal value  𝑢𝑖 . 
Deviation from the optimal estimation 𝑢𝑖  represents the inefficiency which is 
attributed to human error and can be reduced or even eliminated. 𝑣𝑖 is identically and 
independently distributed with Gaussian distribution 𝜈𝑖~ 𝑁 (0, 𝜎𝜈
2). 𝑢𝑖  is an error 
with one-side distribution.15 
Next, we select a vector of inputs which affects the acquirers’ announcement return to 
consider different characteristics of acquisition partners and takeover transactions. 
These inputs are often included in the previous M&A literature as control variables. 
Definitions of our input variables are listed in the Appendix A. We then take a 
logarithmic transformation 16  of equation (3) and include dummy variables to 
characterize deals. 
Specifically, a frontier function for takeover efficiency can be written as: 
                                                      
15 Aigner et al. (1977) assume inefficiency is distributed as half-normal distribution. Meeusen and Broeck (1977) assume the 
inefficiency component as exponential distributed. Stevenson (1980) assumes the inefficiency term as truncated normal 
distributed. 
16 In SFA, log transformation is commonly applied due to the concern of skewness in the sample. 
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ln (𝐴𝐶𝑄_𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖)  =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ln (𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟 𝑀/𝐵𝑖) +  𝛽2  ln (𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖) +
𝛽3  ln ( 𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟 𝑀𝑉𝑖) + 𝛽4 ln (𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑀/𝐵𝑖) + +𝛽5 ln ( 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖) +
𝛽6  ln(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑖) + 𝛽7  𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽8  𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽9 𝑇𝑜𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 + 𝛽10  𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 +
𝛽11𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛽12  𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑣𝑖 − 𝜇𝑖                           (5) 
In this study, we assume the inefficiency component, 𝑢𝑖 ≥ 0, and is distributed as 
exponential distribution (Meeusen and van denk Broeck, 1977). For takeover 
transactions, inefficiencies are mainly due to agency problems or hubris, leading to 
empire building 17  and overpayment. When inefficiency exits ( 𝑢𝑖 > 0 ), actual 
acquirers’ announcement return would be reduced, less than the optimal value. When 
acquisition is fully efficient (𝑢𝑖 = 0), actual acquirers’ stock performances are equal 
to the optimal announcement return. We then estimate the above model (5) by 
maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). In order to confirm the presence of 
inefficiency in takeover, we run a likelihood-ratio test and estimate model (5) by 
ordinary least square (OLS) as comparison. 
 [Insert Table 1] 
Table 1 tabulates coefficients of the independent variables for the production function 
and results estimated by OLS for comparison purpose. The remarkable difference 
between SFA and OLS is the error component. SFA decompose the error term into 
random error and inefficiency component while OLS regards error as idiosyncratic 
error. The OLS method assumes that all takeover deals achieve the optimal (maximum) 
return on the announcement day. Therefore, estimation results should be identical to the 
results by the SFA if and only if the inefficiency component does not exist. A series of 
likelihood-ratio tests are then conducted to examine the existence of inefficiency. The 
null hypothesis that inefficiency does not exist is rejected at 1% significant level. 
Moreover, a ratio of lambda, 𝜆 =  𝜎𝑢/𝜎𝑣 , is calculated standing for the standard 
deviation of inefficiency against the standard deviation of a random shock. Herein, 
                                                      
17 Empire building refers to the situation that acquirers’ management initiate acquisition attempt in the interest of management 
since their compensation is positively associated with firm size. 
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lambda 𝜆 equals 0.4371. That is, the standard deviation of inefficiency component is 
43.71% of the standard error of idiosyncratic component, which indicates that the 
inefficiency in the acquisitions should not be neglected. Therefore, the SFA is a more 
appropriate method to estimate the M&A Index than the OLS. 
We then calculate M&A Index to score the degree of efficiency for each transaction. A 
takeover deal is defined as efficient if acquisition maximizes the acquirer’s return on 
the announcement day. Therefore, the M&A Index gauges the takeover efficiency by 
estimating the distance between the actual acquirer’s return and optimal return when 
the deal is announced to the public. The optimal announcement return is the maximized 
feasible return for the acquirer, and it can be reached by reducing the inefficiency 
issues (agency cost in acquisitions). Specifically, the M&A Index is calculated as a ratio 
of the actual announcement return to optimal return for acquirers, which in nature is a 
technical efficiency. We specify the formula for M&A Index as follows: 
M&A Index = exp{−𝑢𝑖} =
 𝐴𝐶𝑄_𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖
 𝐴𝐶𝑄_𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖
∗ 
where 𝑢𝑖 represents a one-side error for inefficiency in the 𝑖
𝑡ℎdeal,  𝐴𝐶𝑄_𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖  is the observed 
acquirer’s announcement return,  𝐴𝐶𝑄_𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖
∗
 is the optimal acquirers’ announcement return on the 
announcement day. 
Due to the existence of inefficiency,  𝐴𝐶𝑄_𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖 is less than 𝐴𝐶𝑄_𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖
∗
. Therefore, 
merger efficiency index (M&A Index) is normalized, ranging from 0 to 1. If the index 
equals one exactly, then the bid is on the frontier, which indicates the acquirer receives 
the highest abnormal return on the announcement day. 
4. Data 
Data is gathered from several databases. We collect takeover events and relevant 
information from Thomson ONE. Our combined data covers the period from January 
1, 1980 to December 31, 2012. Due to data availability, only public acquisitions are 
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considered, in which acquirers and targets are public firms. The original sample is 
28,065 including both successful and failed transactions. We drop the takeover deals 
worth less than $1 million. We also require that acquirers take over control of targets 
(own more than 50% of targets’ stake) after acquisitions. And it leaves us with 14,706 
deals. Financial information and price/return data are obtained from COMPUSTAT and 
CRSP, respectively. We merger the takeover sample with the COMPUSTAT and CRSP 
by excluding missing values. Finally, we have a sample of 6,254 deals after the above 
selection procedure. 
[Insert Table 2] 
We then estimate the M&A Index for each takeover deal. Table 2 reports the M&A 
Index for the full sample and the distribution of M&A Indices across industries 
(Fama-French industry classification). On average, the M&A Index for the full sample 
is as high as 0.9795 with a minimum of 0.6928 and maximum of 0.9969. Among 6,254 
deals, only 30 bids have indices less than 0.90. This fact 18 indicates that public 
acquisitions are quite efficient, which could be explained by the nature of public deals 
reinforced by market efficiency. Compared to acquisitions involving private targets, 
acquiring firms in public transactions get complete information and therefore identify 
better takeover deals, resulting in more accurate valuations and better market 
responses. However, M&A Indices are all significantly different from 1 (at 1% level), 
suggesting that deals are not completely efficient. 
In Table 2, Panel B shows M&A Index and the number of acquisitions distributed by 
year. In general, the difference of the M&A Index is little among deals for each year. 
There is a merge “boom” between 1994 and 2000, during which the number of takeover 
transactions is above 300. The average efficiency degree gradually decreases. In the 
early years of the boom (1994 and 1995), acquisitions are more efficient than the ones 
occur before the boom. Conversely, the M&A Indices in the later period (1996 to 2000) 
                                                      
18 The high average M&A Indices are also due to the limitation of SFA since SFA requires the log transformation for variables. 
This restriction of SFA limits our sample to deals with positive return on announcement day.  
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are much lower, indicating that acquisitions driven by the merger boom are less 
efficient due to more irrational decisions made by acquirers. Moreover, takeover 
efficiency is negatively affected by financial crisis. Lower M&A indices are frequently 
around the year 2008. 
In Panel C of Table 3, acquisitions are classified according to different industries. 
Transactions are concentrated in the business equipment and financial industries. 
Interestingly, statistics show that takeover deals in the financial industry yield to 
relatively higher values of the M&A index than of the other industries. 
 [Insert Table 3] 
Table 3 presents the summary statistics of corporate fundamentals and deal 
characteristics. We further divide the full sample based on the M&A Index and test the 
difference between the low- and high-efficiency deals. Results confirm the difference 
to be statistically significant, and the M&A Index to be positively monotonic to the 
level of efficiency. However, acquirers in high-efficiency deals pay lower premiums 
than bidding firms in deals with low efficiency. Moreover, acquirers in high-efficiency 
deals have better financial and operating performance than those in low-efficiency 
ones. 
5. Empirical results 
5.1 Deal completion 
As a proxy for the takeover quality, M&A Index is expected to be positively correlated 
with the probability of deal completion. Therefore, we implement both univariate and 
multivariate models to examine this relationship. Firstly, the whole sample is split into 
two subsamples based on whether acquisition attempts eventually complete or fail. 
Panel A of Table 4 shows the index for the unsuccessful subsample is 0.9778 on 
average and this is lower than the successful subsample by 0.0019. This disparity is 
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highly significant at 1% level. This finding indicates that acquirers with higher index 
are more likely to complete the takeover transactions. 
[Insert Table 4] 
We then test the relationship between the index and the deal completion rate with probit 
regressions. Results are listed in Panel B of Table 4. The dependent variable is a 
dummy variable taking a value of one if a deal is completed, or zero otherwise. The 
independent variable is the M&A Index. We also control variables for firm and deal 
characteristics, which are commonly used in previous M&A literature. In panel B, 
model 2 controls the year and industry fixed effects. We also consider acquirer 
clustering effect in model 3 and model 4. Coefficients on M&A Index are positive and 
significant at 1% in all the models, which supports findings in the univariate analysis. 
Therefore, the acquisition is more likely to be successful when the actual acquirer’s 
announcement return approaches the optimal level. A higher index, which has a smaller 
difference between the actual and optimal return, indicates that market appraises 
favorably to the acquisition deal. According to Luo (2005), acquirers’ management 
would learn from market reactions to determine whether to consummate takeover 
transactions. Hence, bidding firms with a better market response are motivated to 
complete the takeover deal. Additionally, higher-efficiency deals suffer less resistance 
from targets’ management, which leads to higher rate of completion. 
Moreover, transactions of larger value tend to reduce the probability of success. We 
also observe a negative relationship between hostile deals and the likelihood of 
completion. Results are consistent to documented findings (Schwert, 2000; Baker et al., 
2012). The completion rate also decreases when the deal involves multiple bidders 
(Walkling, 1985). In contrast, the transaction is more likely to be successful when the 
deal is a tender offer (Baker et al., 2012). 
5.2 Post-acquisition stock performance 
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In this section, we study whether the M&A Index predicts acquirers’ stock performance 
shortly after the deal announcement. We estimate the short-run performance proxy by 
the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over the period from 3 days to 5 days after the 
announcement (ACAR (+3, +5))19. We calculate the cumulative abnormal returns 
based on market-model (Brown and Warner, 1985). The estimation period for market 
model parameters is starting 220 trading days, ending 20 trading days preceding the 
announcement day. Then we compute acquirers’ CARs with a post-event period of 
three days (ACAR (+3, +5)). Table 5 reports the relationships between the M&A Index 
and ACAR (+3, +5) in Panel A (univariate) and Panel B (multivariate analysis). 
[Insert Table 5] 
In Panel A, the full M&A sample is divided into low-efficiency and high-efficiency 
groups according to the index. On average, the ACAR (+3, +5) is 0.0563% in the group 
with high-efficiency deals, which is 0.1145% higher than the ACAR obtained from the 
low-efficiency ones. Hence, the univariate analysis indicates that acquirers in 
higher-efficiency deals earn more return shortly after the announcement day. To check 
the robustness of this finding, we regress the 3-day ACAR on the M&A Index. 
Regressions are estimated by the ordinary least square (OLS) method. Control 
variables are included in both models, including firm and deal characteristics. 
Additionally, model 2 incorporates year, and industry effects. Model 3 and model 4 
control acquirer clustering. Panel B of Table 5 presents regression results and further 
supports the findings in the univariate analysis even after controlling other variables 
and fixed-effects. Coefficients for the index are positive and statistically significant. 
Higher M&A Index indicates a smaller deviation from the optimal announcement 
return, implying market optimism towards a given M&A activity. Acquisitions with 
higher indices are closer to efficiency. Our findings suggest that efficient deals perform 
better in the short run. 
                                                      
19 Since the return on announcement day (day 0) is included in the M&A Index, we exclude the date surrounding day 0 to avoid 
endogenous issue.   
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5.3 Post-acquisition operating performance 
According to Andrade et al. (2001), the expected gains on takeover announcements are 
realized in the form of post-merger profitability. Long-run operating performance is, 
therefore, an indicator of takeover quality and synergy gain. In this section, we 
investigate the relation between the M&A Index and post-merger operating 
performance, which is estimated as an “Industry-Adjusted Return on Asset” (Healy et 
al., 1992) for acquirers. The IAROA is calculated as a difference between the acquirer’s 
ROA and the median ROA across the belonging industry. 
[Insert Table 6] 
In Table 6, the dependent variable is the averaged IAROA of acquirers (A_IAROA) 
over a three-year window after acquisitions. Control variables are included for firm and 
deal characteristics in all regressions. We also control fixed effects of year and industry 
in model 2. In mode 3 and 4, acquirer clustering is considered. In Table 6, coefficients 
of the M&A Index are positive 20  and statistically significant at 1% in all the 
regressions. These findings indicate that deals with higher levels of efficiency perform 
better regarding post-merger profitability. Therefore, empirical evidence confirms that 
the M&A Index is forward-looking and has a significant prediction power towards the 
long-run operating performance of the acquirers. 
5.4 Trading strategy 
Previous literature develops trading strategy on the spread (Elliott et al., 2005), risk 
(Thurner et al., 2003) and trend (James, 2003). This study enriches this thread of 
research by building up strategies based on efficiency (the M&A Index). We construct 
trading strategies according to the value of the M&A Indices. Specifically, the full 
ordered-sample21 is divided into three subsamples (portfolios) by three quantiles 
(tertiles) based on the averaged M&A Index. Portfolio 1 includes deals with the lowest 
                                                      
20 Moreover, the un-tabulated results also show that M&A Index is significantly and positively associated with C_IAROA for 
each fiscal period over three years after announcement. 
21 Here, order stands for the ranking of the values of the M&A Index from the minimum to maximum. 
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M&A Indices; Portfolio 2 includes deals with medium indices; Portfolio 3 includes 
deals with the highest indices. The trading strategy that we employ is to buy and hold 
the acquirers’ stocks after the announcement. The holding period lasts one, two, three, 
four, five and six months, respectively22. 
The return, 𝑟𝑖𝑡, for the 𝑖
𝑡ℎdeal on day t is the acquirer’s daily return obtained from 
CRSP. We then compound daily returns over the holding period T. 𝑅𝑇 =
∏ (1 + 𝑟𝑖𝑡) − 1
𝑇
𝑖=1 . The monthly return is the geometric mean of holding period return, 
denoted by 𝑅 =  (1 + RT)
30/T − 1 . We further measure the performance by 
calculating alphas from a standard CAPM model (Sharpe, 1964) and the Fama-French 
factor models (Fama and French, 1993; Carhart, 1997; Fama and French, 2015). 
[Insert Table 7] 
In Table 7, Panel A presents the average return over various holding periods for the 
three portfolios. Strikingly, we find that the acquiring firms earn around 7% more return 
than the bidders with the lowest indices in the same holding period. The difference 
between the most efficient (Portfolio 3) and least efficient (Portfolio 1) deals is highly 
significant and yields to the largest value, 7.89%, when stocks of the acquiring firms 
are held for one month after the announcement. Returns monotonically increase with 
the length of holding periods in every portfolio, but the gap between Portfolio 3 and 1 
reduces from 7.59 % to 6.92%. Similarly, acquirers in Portfolio 3 profit more than 
bidders in Portfolio 2. The discrepancy between these two groups ranges from 2.17% 
(six-month holding) to 3.97% (one month holding) and are significant at 1%. 
We further examine the performance of the proposed buy-and-hold strategy relative to 
popular benchmark models. We regress daily (monthly return) on market premium and 
multiple factors to get alphas from the CAPM and Fama-French models, respectively. 
In general, we observe similar patterns of the alphas for the three portfolios in Panel B 
of Table 7. The alpha in Portfolio 3 is significantly larger than the one in the rest two 
                                                      
22 To avoid possible large price swings accompanying merger announcements, we exclude the announcement day and start to 
hold acquirers’ stocks from the day after announced date. 
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portfolios, and the difference is statistically significant at 1%. On average, holding an 
acquirer’s stock for one month yields to a monthly alpha of 11% in the case of 
Portfolio 3. The smallest difference of alphas between Portfolio 3 and Portfolio 1 is as 
large as 9.08% in the CAPM. When acquirers stocks are held for more than one month, 
bidders in Portfolio 3 keep outperforming the firms in Portfolio 2 and Portfolio 1. 
We further expand the holding period to twelve, twenty-four and thirty-six months, 
respectively. Results23 show limited consistency and confirm that the trading strategy 
is much more effective when the holding period is within six months after the takeover 
announcement.  
[Insert Table 8] 
We then re-categorize the full sample according to the industry classification. We 
further divide deals belonging to the same industry into the three subgroups based on 
their M&A Indices. Table 8 examines the acquirer’s return and monthly alpha over one 
month after the announcement. In most industries, M&A Indices are positively 
associated with holding period returns. Investors can profit by investing the acquirers in 
the most efficient deals (in the energy and telephone industry, the acquirers return in the 
group with the highest indices is around 13.3% more than the portfolio with the lowest 
indices). 
[Insert Table 9] 
Similarly, we recompose all takeover transactions by every five years. Overall, we find 
that more efficient deals could bring higher return (in pre-specified holding periods) 
and higher monthly alpha for investors. The alpha difference between Portfolio 3 and 
Portfolio 1 is the largest over the period from 1980 to 1994. Interestingly, the acquirer 
returns and monthly alphas are marginally significant from 2005 to 2009, during which 
the one-month return is 4.89%, and monthly alpha is 3.53% in the most efficient deals. 
                                                      
23 Due to the limited length of paper, we do not show the tables for twelve months, twenty-four months and thirty-six months.  
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The adverse stock performance could be attributed to the financial crisis in 2007-2008. 
However, in most efficient deals(with highest M&A Indices), the acquirers earn 9.76% 
more in return while average monthly alpha of the acquirers is 9.76% more than bidders 
in the least efficient deals. In all, higher indices are associated with better stock 
performance in most industries across time. Investors could benefit the most from 
holding stocks of acquirers in the most efficient deals.  
6. Robustness Check 
Since the values of the M&A Index are often above 0.90, its probability distribution 
may wildly deviate from Gaussian. Therefore, results of standard regressions and tests 
could be misleading. In this section, we employ a bootstrapping method as a robustness 
check. By resampling the takeover deals randomly with replacement, we manage to 
generate large numbers of artificial efficiency ratios. We find that the inefficiency 
indeed exists in the takeover samples. 24 In addition, the bootstrapping confirms that 
the M&A Index is significantly different from 0 and 1. The full sample is further 
divided into three groups according to different values of the index.  
Moreover, we include Entrenchment index (E-index) (Bebchuk et al., 2009) to test 
whether the M&A index could reflect the takeover efficiency. Due to the limited data 
resources, we employ the E-index published and contributed by Professor Bebchuk 
who create the E-index. The public data only covers the S&P 500 and some important 
firms over the period from 1990 to 2006. Finally, we have 989 deals after merging the 
E-index file and the sample of M&A index. Bebchuk et al.(2009) find that firms with 
higher E-index are associated with lower firm value and stock returns, implying that 
firms with higher E-index may suffer higher agency cost. The results show that M&A 
index is negatively related with E-index (agency cost) and acquisition premium 
(overpayment), indicating that high agency cost in acquirers (high Entrenchment index) 
and overpayment (high premium) lead to takeover inefficiencies and reduce M&A 
index. Moreover, Cash payment increases the efficiency degree of transactions. These 
                                                      
24 Due to the length restriction, results of robustness checks are not shown. They can be provided by request.  
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findings are consistent with common sense and the assumption of M&A index, 
suggesting that the M&A index could reflect the takeover efficiency.  
We also re-test the relationship between the M&A Indices and deal completion rates, 
premium, short-run and long-run performance, respectively. All bootstrapping results 
unanimously confirm identical properties that we find in practical market observations. 
7. Conclusion  
In this paper, a new measurement of efficiency is introduced and applied to M&A 
practices. Takeover efficiency measures whether the acquirers’ return is maximized on 
the announcement day given a set of firm and deal information. Acquirers’ 
announcement returns are reduced due to inefficiency factors, such as agency cost in 
acquirers and resistance from targets’ management. As a proxy for the takeover 
efficiency, the M&A Index indicates the technical efficiency on the production frontier, 
and its value is standardized between 0 and 1. The reason for choosing acquirers’ 
announcement returns as the output of the SFA is that they reflect the general market 
reaction to the acquisition events. Therefore, the M&A Index measures the gap between 
actual investor responses (as observed from the market) and the theoretical evaluation 
of takeover. By construction, the deal with higher index is more efficient than the one 
with a lower index. 
We then examine the relationship between the M&A Index and the acquisition 
outcome, including the probability of deal completion, acquirers’ short-run stock 
performance and post-acquisition operating performance in the long run. We observe 
that deals with higher indices (or to say, more efficient acquisitions) are more likely to 
complete. In the short run, the M&A Index is positively related to cumulative abnormal 
returns for acquirers. In the long term, acquirers with higher M&A Index perform better 
regarding post-merger operating performance.  
Finally, we managed to construct three portfolios based on different rankings of the 
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M&A Index by imposing buy-and-hold trading strategy to acquirers’ stocks after the 
takeover announcement. Empirical results show that portfolios with higher M&A 
Indices significantly outperform the portfolios with lower indices, especially for the 
six-month holding period. The most efficient portfolio (with highest M&A Indices) 
earns 7.89% higher than least efficient portfolio (with the lowest M&A Indices) when 
holding acquirers’ stocks for one month. We further calculate alphas from the CAPM 
and Fama-French multi-factor models. Monthly alphas for the most efficient portfolio 
are as high as 11.4% by holding acquirers’ stocks for one month after the takeover 
announcement, and this result is robust to different models.  
In sum, this study suggests that the M&A Index is an accurate measurement of 
acquisition efficiency. The M&A Index can effectively forecast the likelihood of deal 
completion and post-acquisition performance in the short run and the long run. Trading 
strategies based on the M&A Index are effective and profitable during the 
post-acquisition period. Therefore, market participants could benefit from this 
composite indicator by evaluating takeover deals in an outright and very simple way. 
Due to the strong predicting power, the M&A Index can be used for investors and 
analysts to forecast firm performance and design trading strategies. Moreover, 
academic research could include M&A Index in regression models to gauge the impact 
of acquisitions.  
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Table 1 Estimation of M&A Index 
Table 1 shows the estimation results of M&A Index estimated by maximum likelihood method (MLE) and 
ordinary least square (OLS). The table tabulates the coefficient for input variables for production function in the 
stochastic frontier analysis (SFA). The variables are same in the ordinary least square (OLS). Definitions of 
variables are listed in the Appendix A. T-values are showed in the table. ***, ** and * represents significant at 1%, 
5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
Estimation 
method 
Stochastic Frontier 
Analysis (SFA) 
Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS)  
Acquirer Tobin's Q 0.0001 0.0001 
 
(0.86) (0.67) 
Acquirer leverage 0.0108** 0.0104** 
 
(2.20) (2.08) 
Acquirer MV -0.0010** 0.0001 
 
(-2.03) (0.08) 
Target Tobin's Q 0.0001 0.0001 
 
(0.82) (0.60) 
Target leverage -0.0028 -0.0011 
 
(-0.67) (-0.24) 
Transaction Value -0.0037*** -0.0046*** 
 
(-7.25) (-9.05) 
Hostile -0.0118*** -0.0084** 
 
(-2.97) (-2.07) 
Tender offer 0.0229*** 0.0222*** 
 
(12.73) (12.11) 
Toehold -0.0023 -0.0008 
 
(-1.46) (-0.51) 
Stock -0.0148** -0.0157*** 
 
(-8.45) (-8.77) 
Competing -0.0028 -0.0028 
 
(-0.78) (-0.78) 
Diversification -0.0097*** -0.0098*** 
 
(-5.68) (-5.57) 
Constant  0.0483*** 0.0235*** 
 
(16.76) (8.77) 
 
  
Observation:  6254 6254 
Log likelihood   9527.1399 N/A 
Adjusted R-square N/A 0.0876 
26 
 
Table 2 Descriptive data  
Table 2 lists the descriptive data for M&A Index. Specifically, the table shows the observation (number of M&A 
Indices), mean, median, Sd (standard deviation), minimum, quintile and maximum for M&A Indices. We also 
tabulate the distribution of M&A Indices classified by industry and year. The industry classification is according to 
Fama-French 12 industry classification.  
 
Panel A: M&A Index for the full sample 
  Observation  Mean Median Standard deviation Min 25% 75% Max 
M&A Index 6254 0.9795 0.9814 0.0125 0.6928 0.9786 0.9837 0.9969 
             
Panel B: M&A Index classified by year 
Year Observation Percent Mean Median Sd Min 25% 75% Max 
1980 4 0.06% 0.9790 0.9781 0.0029 0.9767 0.9768 0.9812 0.9830 
1981 25 0.40% 0.9781 0.9796 0.0077 0.9496 0.9768 0.9818 0.9889 
1982 46 0.74% 0.9797 0.9804 0.0046 0.9664 0.9772 0.9817 0.9905 
1983 86 1.38% 0.9796 0.9804 0.0048 0.9570 0.9782 0.9821 0.9906 
1984 206 3.29% 0.9800 0.9814 0.0086 0.9121 0.9787 0.9836 0.9926 
1985 97 1.55% 0.9796 0.9809 0.0083 0.9141 0.9783 0.9828 0.9911 
1986 98 1.57% 0.9784 0.9808 0.0124 0.8988 0.9778 0.9831 0.9891 
1987 136 2.17% 0.9799 0.9816 0.0103 0.8950 0.9786 0.9847 0.9947 
1988 143 2.29% 0.9797 0.9810 0.0110 0.8694 0.9784 0.9838 0.9944 
1989 163 2.61% 0.9806 0.9813 0.0059 0.9570 0.9784 0.9841 0.9964 
1990 153 2.45% 0.9794 0.9810 0.0076 0.9469 0.9780 0.9836 0.9935 
1991 113 1.81% 0.9800 0.9813 0.0050 0.9632 0.9777 0.9828 0.9903 
1992 98 1.57% 0.9804 0.9819 0.0081 0.9318 0.9786 0.9846 0.9934 
1993 134 2.14% 0.9808 0.9821 0.0074 0.9238 0.9795 0.9840 0.9923 
1994 304 4.86% 0.9810 0.9817 0.0057 0.9296 0.9789 0.9836 0.9969 
1995 331 5.29% 0.9802 0.9812 0.0059 0.9178 0.9785 0.9830 0.9949 
1996 401 6.41% 0.9799 0.9812 0.0122 0.7933 0.9790 0.9834 0.9967 
1997 370 5.92% 0.9799 0.9814 0.0150 0.7205 0.9789 0.9838 0.9924 
1998 406 6.49% 0.9796 0.9813 0.0107 0.8306 0.9783 0.9838 0.9937 
1999 421 6.73% 0.9799 0.9817 0.0105 0.8872 0.9784 0.9845 0.9960 
2000 471 7.53% 0.9769 0.9816 0.0206 0.6928 0.9776 0.9846 0.9946 
2001 274 4.38% 0.9783 0.9810 0.0150 0.8065 0.9778 0.9837 0.9946 
2002 147 2.35% 0.9793 0.9808 0.0090 0.9176 0.9768 0.9837 0.9944 
2003 193 3.09% 0.9764 0.9808 0.0220 0.8220 0.9773 0.9830 0.9931 
2004 194 3.10% 0.9788 0.9810 0.0108 0.8824 0.9787 0.9833 0.9930 
2005 177 2.83% 0.9794 0.9817 0.0163 0.8262 0.9797 0.9834 0.9920 
2006 187 2.99% 0.9804 0.9820 0.0090 0.9028 0.9796 0.9838 0.9921 
2007 196 3.13% 0.9790 0.9817 0.0233 0.7286 0.9796 0.9834 0.9916 
2008 163 2.61% 0.9792 0.9810 0.0107 0.8925 0.9781 0.9838 0.9939 
2009 112 1.79% 0.9794 0.9807 0.0090 0.9344 0.9774 0.9836 0.9953 
2010 136 2.17% 0.9805 0.9816 0.0062 0.9337 0.9785 0.9835 0.9913 
2011 131 2.09% 0.9802 0.9819 0.0097 0.9082 0.9796 0.9840 0.9940 
2012 138 2.21% 0.9812 0.9824 0.0066 0.9483 0.9797 0.9797 0.9931 
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Panel C: M&A Index classified by industry 
Industry Observation Percent Mean Median Sd Min 25% 75% Max 
Consumer durables 118 1.89% 0.9800 0.9812 0.0102 0.895 0.9812 0.9842 0.9930 
Consumer nondurables 315 5.04% 0.9809 0.9819 0.0074 0.9176 0.9819 0.9842 0.9927 
Business equipment 1203 19.24% 0.9775 0.9815 0.0198 0.6928 0.9815 0.9839 0.9946 
Chemical products 173 2.77% 0.9816 0.9815 0.0039 0.9684 0.9815 0.9845 0.9927 
Oil, Gas, and Coal 216 3.45% 0.9768 0.9804 0.0175 0.8262 0.9804 0.9831 0.9924 
Healthcare 502 8.03% 0.9785 0.9815 0.014 0.8601 0.9815 0.9838 0.9940 
Manufacturing 546 8.73% 0.9792 0.9811 0.0144 0.7808 0.9811 0.9836 0.9930 
Finance 1875 29.98% 0.9806 0.9814 0.0059 0.8755 0.9814 0.9832 0.9964 
Wholesale and retail 470 7.52% 0.9799 0.9813 0.0097 0.8851 0.9813 0.9838 0.9969 
Telephone and television 188 3.01% 0.9799 0.9818 0.012 0.8857 0.9818 0.984 0.9953 
Utilities 108 1.73% 0.9795 0.9817 0.0111 0.8927 0.9817 0.9833 0.9926 
Others 540 8.63% 0.9801 0.9812 0.0082 0.9187 0.9812 0.9843 0.9960 
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics of variables for takeover deals in the full sample and the subsample classified by the value of M&A Index. The table lists the mean (number) and 
standard deviation (percent) of variables (dummy variables) for firm and deal characteristics. M&A Index is the measurement of takeover efficiency, calculated as a ratio of actual acquirers' 
announcement return over optimal announcement return (estimated by SFA). Definitions of variables are listed in the Appendix A. ***, ** and * represents significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. 
 
Variables 
Full sample (І) Low-efficiency deals  (ΙΙ) High-efficiency deals (ΙΙΙ) Difference 
Mean 
(Number) 
Standard deviation 
(percent) 
Mean 
(Number) 
Standard deviation 
(percent) 
Mean 
(Number) 
Standard deviation 
(percent) 
(ΙΙΙ)- (ΙΙ)  
Panel A: Acquirer related  
      
  
Market Value  8562.2610 30415.9600 5410.0420 22071.1100 11713.5800 36652.3800 6303.5330*** 
Tobin's Q 3.0026 23.9070 2.5716 10.6347 3.4334 32.0883 -0.8618 
Leverage  0.1610 0.1705 0.1678 0.1751 0.1542 0.1655 -0.0136*** 
Return on Assets (ROA) 0.0350 0.1183 0.0308 0.1279 0.0392 0.1077 0.0084*** 
Panel B: Target related  
       Market Value  2853.0660 15288.8500 1589.5170 9162.8300 4105.3370 19471.0300 2515.8200*** 
Tobin's Q 2.4153 15.3577 2.1075 6.9847 2.7230 20.5610 0.6155* 
Leverage  0.1571 0.1924 0.1603 0.1959 0.1538 0.1888 -0.0065 
Return on Assets (ROA) -0.0120 0.6810 -0.0254 0.9320 0.0015 0.2424 0.0269* 
Panel C: Deal related 
       M&A Index 0.9795 0.0119 0.9754 0.0153 0.9846 0.0025 0.0093*** 
Transaction value ($millions)  773.5128 3510.8970 709.5833 3661.0230 837.4240 3353.4130 127.8407 
Premium (%) 0.1204 1.5178 0.1381 1.9352 0.1026 0.9266 -0.0355 
Hostile takeover 242  3.87% 124 3.97% 118 3.77% 
 Tender Offer 1275  20.39% 787 25.17% 488 15.61% 
 Toehold 5132  82.06% 2571 82.22% 2561 81.90% 
 Competing bid 288  4.61% 142 4.54% 146 4.67% 
 Diversification  1328  21.23% 614 19.64% 714 22.83% 
 Cash 4032  64.47% 1975 63.16% 2057 65.78% 
 Stock  1292  20.66% 560 17.91% 732 23.41% 
 
Number of observations 6254 3127 3127   
29 
 
Table 4 Analysis for probability of deal completion 
Table 4 presents analysis for the rate of successful deals. Panel A shows the M&A Index for successful and 
unsuccessful transactions. Panel B tabulates the probit regression results. The dependent variable is the dummy 
variable which equals 1 when the takeover deal is finally completed and equals 0 when the transactions are failed or 
withdrawn. The independent variable is the M&A Index calculated by stochastic frontier analysis (SFA). We also 
control the firm and deal characteristics. Definitions of variables are listed in the Appendix A. Fixed effects are 
considered in model 2, including industry and year fixed effects. Model 3 and model 4 incorporates acquirer 
clustering. ***, ** and * represents significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
Panel A: Univariate analysis 
Classification 
Failed   Completion Difference     
(І) (ΙΙ) (ΙΙ)-(І) 
Mean 0.9778*** 0.9797*** 0.0019*** 
Standard Deviation 0.0211 0.0107 
 
    
Observation 775 5479   
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Panel B: Multivariate analysis 
Completion Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
M&A index 5.2729*** 4.5600*** 4.8676*** 4.5600*** 
 
(3.53) (2.98) (3.08) (2.83) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 
 
(0.86) (1.25) (1.49) (1.51) 
Acquirer Price To Earnings 0.0000 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 
 
(-0.04) (0.44) (0.64) (1.01) 
Acquirer Leverage  -0.0514 -0.1464 -0.0468 -0.1464 
 
(-0.55) (-1.46) (-0.44) (-1.33) 
Acquirer Cash Flow To Asset 0.1802 0.2475 0.1111 0.2475 
 
(0.82) (1.13) (0.53) (1.19) 
Target Tobin's Q -0.0029 -0.0018 -0.0029 -0.0018 
 
(-1.04) (-0.61) (-1.31) (-0.87) 
Target Price To Earnings 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
(0.24) (0.08) (0.05) (0.10) 
Target Leverage  0.0094 -0.0166 0.0169 -0.0166 
 
(0.13) (-0.22) (0.18) (-0.16) 
Target Cash Flow To Asset -0.1156 -0.1013 -0.0902 -0.1013 
 
(-0.82) (-0.72) (-0.67) (-0.75) 
Relative deal size  -0.2465*** -0.2439*** -0.2544*** -0.2439*** 
 
(-6.39) (-6.11) (-4.77) (-4.71) 
Hostile takeover -1.6988*** -1.6977*** -1.7183*** -1.6978*** 
 
(-15.96) (-15.62) (-15.58) (-15.30) 
Tender offer 0.5901*** 0.6383*** 0.5961*** 0.6383*** 
 
(9.03) (9.41) (8.04) (8.54) 
Pure Cash deal -0.2846*** -0.2833*** -0.2692*** -0.2833*** 
 
(-5.94) (-5.28) (-4.68) (-4.91) 
Competing bid -0.8927*** -0.9459*** -0.9592*** -0.9459*** 
 
(-9.63) (-9.84) (-9.16) (-9.10) 
Diversification 0.0164 0.0315 0.0080 0.0315 
 
(0.29) (0.53) (0.13) (0.52) 
Constant -3.7407*** -3.3872** -3.5894** -3.3872** 
 
(-2.56) (-2.25) (-2.31) (-2.13) 
 
    
Year-fixed-effects No Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed-effects  No Yes No Yes 
Firm clustering  No No Yes Yes 
Observations 6975 6975 6975 6975 
Pseudo R2 0.132 0.170 0.163 0.170 
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Table 5 Analysis for post-acquisition stock performance in the short-run 
Table 5 shows analysis for post-acquisition stock performance in the short-run. In panel A, the full sample is 
divided into low-efficiency and high-efficiency subsamples based on M&A Index. Panel A presents short-run stock 
performance in low-efficiency and high-efficiency group. Panel B shows the regression results for post-acquisition 
performance in the short-run. The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return for acquirers over the 
period 3 days to 5 days after announcement day (ACAR (+3, +5)). The independent variable is the M&A Index 
calculated by stochastic frontier analysis (SFA). We also control the firm and deal characteristics. Definitions of 
variables are listed in the Appendix A. Fixed effects are considered in model 2, including industry and year fixed 
effects. Model 3 and model 4 incorporates acquirer clustering. ***, ** and * represents significant at 1%, 5% and 
10%, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Univariate analysis 
ACAR(+3,+5) 
Low-efficiency High-efficiency Difference     
(І) (ΙΙ) (ΙΙ)-(І) 
Mean -0.0582% 0.0563% 0.1145%*** 
Standard Deviation 0.0424 0.0488 
 
    
Observation 3127 3127   
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Panel B: Multivariate analysis 
ACAR(+3,+5) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
M&A index 0.1704*** 0.1861*** 0.1857* 0.1861* 
 
(3.64) (3.95) (1.65) (1.66) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
 
(-0.95) (-0.92) (-1.64) (-1.43) 
Acquirer Price To Earnings 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
 
(0.47) (0.31) (0.92) (0.84) 
Acquirer Leverage  0.0002* 0.0002* 0.0002* 0.0002* 
 
(1.89) (1.72) (1.86) (1.83) 
Acquirer Cash Flow To Asset 0.0038* 0.0041* 0.0037 0.0041 
 
(1.70) (1.80) (0.96) (1.06) 
Target Tobin's Q 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
 
(0.71) (0.80) (0.59) (0.62) 
Target Price To Earnings -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0000* 
 
(-1.56) (-1.51) (-1.63) (-1.70) 
Target Leverage  -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 
 
(-0.90) (-0.93) (-0.89) (-0.81) 
Target Cash Flow To Asset -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 
 
(-0.84) (-0.76) (-0.86) (-0.81) 
Relative deal size  0.0007 0.0008 0.0007 0.0008 
 
(1.03) (1.19) (0.61) (0.73) 
Hostile takeover -0.0053 -0.0056* -0.0058* -0.0056* 
 
(-1.62) (-1.71) (-1.91) (-1.82) 
Tender offer -0.0008 -0.0010 -0.0012 -0.0010 
 
(-0.58) (-0.68) (-0.86) (-0.71) 
Pure Cash deal 0.0025** 0.0023* 0.0025* 0.0023* 
 
(2.11) (1.81) (1.87) (1.70) 
Competing bid -0.0011 -0.0014 -0.00144 -0.0014 
 
(-0.39) (-0.48) (-0.50) (-0.49) 
Diversification -0.0033** -0.0037** -0.0036** -0.0037** 
 
(-2.31) (-2.53) (-2.33) (-2.38) 
Constant -0.1681*** -0.1892*** -0.1860* -0.1892* 
 
(-3.67) (-4.09) (-1.68) (-1.71) 
 
    
Year-fixed-effects No Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed-effects  No Yes No Yes 
Firm clustering  No No Yes Yes 
Observations 6975 6975 6975 6975 
Adjust R2 0.004 0.009 0.009 0.009 
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Table 6 long-run operating performance  
Table 6 reports the relation between M&A Index and long-run operating performance after acquisitions.  The 
dependent variable is average industry-adjusted ROA of acquirers for three years post-acquisition (IAROA). 
IAROA is bidder's return on assets, deducting median ROA in the industry with the same first two digits SIC code 
as acquirers’. The independent variable is the M&A Index calculated by stochastic frontier analysis (SFA). We also 
control the firm and deal characteristics. Definitions of variables are listed in the Appendix A. T-values are showed 
in the table. Fixed effects are considered in model 2, including industry and year fixed effects. Model 3 and model 
4 incorporates acquirer clustering. ***, ** and * represents significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
Average 3-year IAROA Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
M&A index 1.4712*** 1.2641*** 1.2724*** 1.2641*** 
 
(3.18) (2.72) (3.60) (3.57) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q -0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 
 
(-0.14) (0.49) (1.00) (1.33) 
Acquirer Price To Earnings -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
 
(-0.47) (-0.45) (-0.69) (-0.77) 
Acquirer Leverage  0.0546** 0.0591** 0.0632** 0.0591* 
 
(2.33) (2.42) (2.16) (1.85) 
Acquirer Cash Flow To Asset 0.3650*** 0.3586*** 0.3519*** 0.3586*** 
 
(6.74) (6.49) (4.55) (4.69) 
Target Tobin's Q -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
 
(-0.02) (0.21) (0.11) (0.22) 
Target Price To Earnings 0.0001 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 
 
(0.38) (0.30) (0.78) (0.68) 
Target Leverage  0.0207 0.0236 0.0241* 0.0236 
 
(1.06) (1.20) (1.73) (1.48) 
Target Cash Flow To Asset 0.0665** 0.0765** 0.0707** 0.0765** 
 
(2.07) (2.31) (2.02) (2.25) 
Relative deal size  -0.0091 -0.0073     -0.0092* -0.0073 
 
(-1.37) (-1.09) (-1.85) (-1.45) 
Hostile takeover 0.0048 0.0011 0.0000 0.0011 
 
(0.15) (0.03) (-0.00) (0.11) 
Tender offer 0.0118 0.0114 0.0094 0.0114 
 
(0.85) (0.80) (0.78) (0.84) 
Pure Cash deal 0.0149 0.0215* 0.02175** 0.0215*** 
 
(1.31) (1.72) (2.37) (2.77) 
Competing bid 0.0110 0.0102 0.0112 0.0102 
 
(0.39) (0.36) (0.78) (0.71) 
Diversification 0.0051 0.0062 0.0057 0.0062 
 
(0.37) (0.44) (0.73) (0.86) 
Constant -2.153*** -1.9785*** -1.9812*** -1.9785*** 
 
(-4.75) (-4.33) (-5.61) (-5.60) 
 
    
Year-fixed-effects No Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed-effects  No Yes No Yes 
Firm clustering  No No Yes Yes 
Observations 6975 6975 6975 6975 
Adjust R2 0.016 0.026 0.024 0.026 
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Table 7 Trading strategy  
Table 7 shows the holding period return in panel A and monthly alpha for a trading strategy in panel B for trading 
strategy on M&A Index. The full sample is split into three portfolios on the basis of M&A Index of each deal. 
Portfolio 1 is the group with lowest indices which is the portfolio with inefficient deals. Portfolio 3 is the group 
with highest indices which is portfolio with efficient deals. Portfolio 2 is the group of those having neutral indices. 
To avoid the large movement in acquirers stocks due to the takeover announcement, we exclude the date 
announced and start to hold stocks from the day after the takeover announcement. Panel A reports the average 
holding period return over 1 to 6 months after announced day and the mean difference between each two portfolios. 
To calculate the monthly alpha, we adopt four models for benchmarking, including CAPM, Fama-French 3 factors, 
Fama-French 4 factors and Fama-French 5 factors. Panel B shows the monthly alpha for portfolios over different 
holding periods and the difference between each two groups. ***, ** and * represents significant at 1%, 5% and 
10%, respectively.    
 
Panel A: Holding period return 
Holding Period 
Return 
 Portfolio     
(least efficient) 
 Portfolio  
 Portfolio 
(most efficient)  
Difference Difference Difference 
 (І)  (ΙΙ) (ΙΙΙ)  (ΙΙ)-(І) (ΙΙΙ)-(ΙΙ) (ΙΙΙ)- (І) 
       Holding 1 month -0.0184*** 0.0207*** 0.0604*** 0.0391*** 0.0397*** 0.0789*** 
Holding 2 months -0.0082*** 0.0308*** 0.0676*** 0.0390*** 0.0369*** 0.0759*** 
Holding 3 months 0.0067*** 0.0446*** 0.0797*** 0.0380*** 0.0351*** 0.0731*** 
Holding 4 months 0.0067*** 0.0510*** 0.0864*** 0.0442*** 0.0354*** 0.0796*** 
Holding 5 months 0.0299*** 0.0736*** 0.0969*** 0.0437*** 0.0233*** 0.0670*** 
Holding 6 months 0.0365*** 0.0839*** 0.1057*** 0.0474*** 0.0217** 0.0692*** 
       Observation 2085 2085 2084       
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Panel B: Monthly alpha for various models 
Monthly Alpha Model 
 Portfolio     
(least efficient) 
 Portfolio  
 Portfolio  
(most efficient)  
Difference Difference Difference 
 (І)  (ΙΙ) (ΙΙΙ)  (ΙΙ)-(І) (ΙΙΙ)-(ΙΙ) (ΙΙΙ)- (І) 
Holding 1 month 
Alpha_CAPM 0.0264*** 0.0451*** 0.1173*** 0.0187*** 0.0721*** 0.0908*** 
Alpha_FF3 0.0205*** 0.0459*** 0.1141*** 0.0254*** 0.0682*** 0.0936*** 
Alpha_FF4 0.0202*** 0.0474*** 0.1172*** 0.0272*** 0.0698*** 0.0970*** 
Alpha_FF5 -0.3937*** -0.3715*** -0.3407*** 0.0222*** 0.0308*** 0.0531*** 
 
       
Holding 2 months 
Alpha_CAPM 0.0131*** 0.0203*** 0.0444*** 0.0072*** 0.0241*** 0.0313*** 
Alpha_FF3 0.0074*** 0.0175*** 0.0434*** 0.0101*** 0.0259*** 0.0360*** 
Alpha_FF4 0.0086*** 0.0193*** 0.0410*** 0.0107*** 0.0217*** 0.0324*** 
Alpha_FF5 -0.3885*** -0.3709*** -0.3481*** 0.0176*** 0.0229*** 0.0404*** 
 
       
Holding 3 months 
Alpha_CAPM 0.0038*** 0.0101*** 0.0250*** 0.0063*** 0.0149*** 0.0212*** 
Alpha_FF3 -0.0001*** 0.0085*** 0.0249*** 0.0086*** 0.0164*** 0.0250*** 
Alpha_FF4 0.0008*** 0.0100*** 0.0229*** 0.0091*** 0.0129*** 0.0220*** 
Alpha_FF5 -0.3851*** -0.3708*** -0.3497*** 0.0142*** 0.0212*** 0.0354*** 
 
       
Holding 4 months 
Alpha_CAPM 0.0009*** 0.0062*** 0.0170*** 0.0053*** 0.0108*** 0.0161*** 
Alpha_FF3 -0.0021*** 0.0051*** 0.0171*** 0.0072*** 0.0120*** 0.0192*** 
Alpha_FF4 -0.0013*** 0.0063*** 0.0154*** 0.0077*** 0.0091*** 0.0167*** 
Alpha_FF5 -0.3816*** -0.3707*** -0.3502*** 0.0109*** 0.0206*** 0.0315*** 
 
       
Holding 5 months 
Alpha_CAPM -0.0002*** 0.0043*** 0.0127*** 0.0045*** 0.0084*** 0.0130*** 
Alpha_FF3 -0.0027*** 0.0035*** 0.0129*** 0.0062*** 0.0094*** 0.0156*** 
Alpha_FF4 -0.0021*** 0.0045*** 0.0114*** 0.0066*** 0.0069*** 0.0135*** 
Alpha_FF5 -0.3795*** -0.3699*** -0.3515*** 0.0096*** 0.0184*** 0.0280*** 
 
       
Holding 6 months 
Alpha_CAPM -0.0007*** 0.0032*** 0.0101*** 0.0039*** 0.0069*** 0.0109*** 
Alpha_FF3 -0.0028*** 0.0026*** 0.0103*** 0.0054*** 0.0078*** 0.0132*** 
Alpha_FF4 -0.0023*** 0.0034*** 0.0090*** 0.0057*** 0.0056*** 0.0113*** 
Alpha_FF5 -0.3774*** -0.3683*** -0.3509*** 0.0091*** 0.0174*** 0.0265*** 
        Observation   2085 2085 2084       
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Table 8 Trading strategy classified by industry 
Table 8 shows holding period return in panel A and monthly alpha for a trading strategy in panel B for trading 
strategy on M&A Index, classified by industry. The full sample is split into 3 portfolios on the basis of M&A Index of 
each deal. Portfolio 1 is the group with lowest indices which is the portfolio with inefficient deals. Portfolio 3 is the 
group with highest indices which is the portfolio with efficient deals. Portfolio 2 is the group of those having neutral 
indices. To avoid the large movement in acquirers stocks due to the takeover announcement, we exclude the date 
announced and start to hold stocks from the day after the takeover announcement. Panel A reports the average 
holding period return over 1 to 6 months after announced day and the mean difference between each two portfolios. 
To calculate the monthly alpha, we adopt four models for benchmarking, including CAPM, Fama-French 3 factors, 
Fama-French 4 factors and Fama-French 5 factors. Panel B shows the monthly alpha for portfolios over different 
holding periods and the difference between each two groups. The industry classification is according to 
Fama-French 12 industry classification. ***, ** and * represents significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.   
 
Panel A: Holding period return 
Holding Period Return 
for Industry 
 Portfolio     
(least 
efficient) 
 Portfolio  
 Portfolio 
(most 
efficient)  
Difference Difference Difference 
 (І)  (ΙΙ) (ΙΙΙ)  (ΙΙ)-(І) (ΙΙΙ)-(ΙΙ) (ΙΙΙ)- (І) 
Telephone and Television -0.0607*** 0.0254*** 0.0731*** 0.0861*** 0.0477 0.1338*** 
observation 78 77 75 
   
Oil, Gas, and Coal -0.0843*** 0.0350*** 0.0500*** 0.1193*** 0.015 0.1343*** 
observation 84 82 81 
   
Consumer Durables -0.0184*** 0.0207*** 0.0604*** 0.0288 0.0732** 0.1020*** 
observation 54 52 58 
   
Business Equipment -0.0333*** 0.0165*** 0.0639*** 0.0498*** 0.0475*** 0.0972*** 
observation 388 380 381 
   
Manufacturing -0.0115*** 0.0244*** 0.0612*** 0.0359*** 0.0369*** 0.0727*** 
observation 173 172 170 
   
Chemicals Products -0.0264*** 0.0189*** 0.0618*** 0.0453** 0.0429** 0.0882*** 
observation 70 68 73 
   
Consumer Non-Durables -0.0071*** 0.0201*** 0.0734*** 0.0273 0.0533*** 0.0805*** 
observation 103 99 105 
   
Healthcare -0.0284*** 0.0173*** 0.0584*** 0.0457*** 0.0411*** 0.0868*** 
observation 168 174 165 
   
Wholesale and retail 0.0057*** 0.0278*** 0.0821*** 0.022 0.0544*** 0.0764*** 
observation 163 166 164 
   
Finance -0.0058*** 0.0170*** 0.0440*** 0.0228*** 0.0271*** 0.0498*** 
observation 576 589 594 
   
Utilities -0.0094*** 0.0154*** 0.0294*** 0.0249 0.014 0.0389** 
observation 51 59 57 
   
Other -0.0174*** 0.0322*** 0.0868*** 0.0497*** 0.0546*** 0.1042*** 
observation 177 179 181       
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Panel B: Monthly alpha 
Monthly alpha for 
Industry 
 Portfolio     
(least 
efficient) 
 Portfolio  
 Portfolio 
(most 
efficient)  
Difference Difference Difference 
 (І)  (ΙΙ) (ΙΙΙ)  (ΙΙ)-(І) (ΙΙΙ)-(ΙΙ) (ΙΙΙ)- (І) 
Telephone and Television  -0.2987*** 0.0806*** 0.0306*** 0.3794*** -0.0501*** 0.3293*** 
observation 78 77 75 
   Oil, Gas, and Coal -0.1771*** 0.0296*** -0.1111*** 0.2067*** -0.1406*** 0.0661*** 
observation 84 82 81 
   Consumer Durables 0.0097*** -0.0522*** 0.0251*** -0.0619*** 0.0773*** 0.0154** 
observation 54 52 58 
   Business Equipment 0.0547*** 0.0795*** 0.1231*** 0.0248*** 0.0435*** 0.0683*** 
observation 388 380 381 
   Manufacturing -0.0194*** 0.0191*** 0.1379*** 0.0385*** 0.1188*** 0.1573*** 
observation 173 172 170 
   Chemicals Products 0.0102*** 0.0765*** 0.0942*** 0.0663*** 0.0177*** 0.0840*** 
observation 70 68 73 
   Consumer Non-Durables -0.0628*** -0.0531*** 0.1320*** 0.0097** 0.1851*** 0.1948*** 
observation 103 99 105 
   Healthcare -0.0056*** 0.0456*** 0.1530*** 0.0512*** 0.1075*** 0.1587*** 
observation 168 174 165 
   Wholesale and retail -0.0312*** 0.0049*** 0.1757*** 0.0361*** 0.0544*** 0.2068*** 
observation 163 166 164 
   Finance 0.0970*** 0.0662*** 0.1315*** -0.0309*** 0.0654*** 0.0345*** 
observation 576 589 594 
   Utilities 0.0999*** 0.0154*** -0.0569*** 0.0383*** -0.1952*** -0.1568*** 
observation 51 59 57 
   Other 0.0056*** 0.0270*** 0.1137*** 0.0214*** 0.0867*** 0.1081*** 
observation 177 179 181       
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Table 9 Trading strategy classified by year 
Table 9 shows holding period return in panel A and monthly alpha for a trading strategy in panel B for trading 
strategy on M&A Index, classified by industry. The full sample is split into 3 portfolios on the basis of M&A Index of 
each deal. Portfolio 1 is the group with lowest indices which is the portfolio with inefficient deals. Portfolio 3 is the 
group with highest indices which is the portfolio with efficient deals. Portfolio 2 is the group of those having neutral 
indices. To avoid the large movement in acquirers stocks due to the takeover announcement, we exclude the date 
announced and start to hold stocks from the day after the takeover announcement. Panel A reports the average 
holding period return over 1 to 6 months after announced day and the mean difference between each two portfolios. 
To calculate the monthly alpha, we adopt four models for benchmarking, including CAPM, Fama-French 3 factors, 
Fama-French 4 factors and Fama-French 5 factors. Panel B shows the monthly alpha for portfolios over different 
holding periods and the difference between each two groups.  ***, ** and * represents significant at 1%, 5% and 
10%, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: Holding period return 
Holding Period 
Return for year 
 Portfolio     
(least efficient) 
 Portfolio  
 Portfolio 
(most efficient)  
Difference Difference Difference 
 (І)  (ΙΙ) (ΙΙΙ)  (ΙΙ)-(І) (ΙΙΙ)-(ΙΙ) (ΙΙΙ)- (І) 
1980-1984 -0.0215*** -0.0095*** 0.0732*** 0.0121 0.0826*** 0.0947*** 
observation 98 93 85 
   1985-1989 -0.0262*** 0.0246*** 0.0702*** 0.0508*** 0.0456*** 0.0964*** 
observation 204 202 206 
   1990-1994 -0.0104*** 0.0107*** 0.0624*** 0.0211* 0.0517*** 0.0728*** 
observation 273 264 263 
   1995-1999 -0.0112*** 0.0248*** 0.0556*** 0.0360*** 0.0308*** 0.0668*** 
observation 621 636 626 
   2000-2004 -0.0202*** 0.0344*** 0.0644*** 0.0546 0.0300*** 0.0846*** 
observation 441 440 448 
   2005-2009 -0.0333*** 0.0059*** 0.0489*** 0.0386*** 0.0430*** 0.0816*** 
observation 289 295 293 
   2010-2012 -0.0148*** 0.0191*** 0.0642*** 0.0339*** 0.0450*** 0.0789*** 
observation 159 154 163       
 
Panel B: Monthly alpha 
Monthly alpha for 
year  
 Portfolio     
(least efficient) 
 Portfolio  
 Portfolio 
(most efficient)  
Difference Difference Difference 
 (І)  (ΙΙ) (ΙΙΙ)  (ΙΙ)-(І) (ΙΙΙ)-(ΙΙ) (ΙΙΙ)- (І) 
1980-1984 -0.0384*** 0.0521*** 0.1448*** 0.0906*** 0.0927*** 0.1833*** 
observation 98 93 85 
   1985-1989 0.0159*** 0.0198*** 0.1199*** 0.0039 0.1001*** 0.1040*** 
observation 204 202 206 
   1990-1994 0.0422*** 0.0642*** 0.1716*** 0.0220*** 0.1074*** 0.1294*** 
observation 273 264 263 
   1995-1999 0.0367*** 0.0375*** 0.0900*** 0.0009 0.0525*** 0.0533*** 
observation 621 636 626 
   2000-2004 0.0518*** 0.1128*** 0.1719*** 0.0610*** 0.0591*** 0.1210*** 
observation 441 440 448 
   2005-2009 -0.0624*** 0.0229*** 0.0353*** 0.0852*** 0.0124*** 0.0976*** 
observation 289 295 293 
   2010-2012 0.0287*** -0.0129*** 0.1168*** -0.0416*** 0.1297*** 0.0881*** 
observation 159 154 163       
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Appendix A 
Variables  Definitions  
Panel A: Key independent variables  
M&A Index M&A Index is the measurement of takeover efficiency, calculated as a ratio of actual acquirers' announcement return 
over optimal acquirers' announcement return (estimated by Stochastic Frontier Analysis). 
Panel B: Post-acquisition performance 
ACAR(+3,+5)  ACAR (+3, +5) refers to the cumulative abnormal return for acquirers over the period 3 days to 5 days after 
announcement day. This variable is calculated by the market model (Brown and Warner, 1985) with value-weighted 
CRSP index as a benchmark for market return and an estimation period starting 200 trading days and ending 20 trading 
days before the M&A deal announcement.  
Industry-adjusted Return on Asset 
of acquirer (A_IAROA) 
A_ IAROA is bidder's return on assets (ROA), deducting median ROA in the industry with the same first 2-digit SIC 
code as acquirers’.  
Panel C: Firm characteristics  
Tobin's Q Tobin's Q is computed as the ratio of market value to book value of the company's assets. 
Market Value (MV) The market value is calculated as the number of shares outstanding multiplied by the respective stock price at 4 weeks 
before the official deal announcement.  
Leverage Leverage ratio is total debt, which is the sum of long-term debt and short-term debt, divided by firm's total asset. 
Return on Assets (ROA) ROA is computed as the ratio of the company's net income by the book value of total assets. 
Price to earnings  Price to earnings is calculated as share price four weeks before announcement divided by earnings per share excluding 
extraordinary items. 
Cash flow to asset Cash flow to asset is a ratio of cash flow over total assets. Cash flow is operating income before extraordinary items, 
adding depreciation and subtracting dividends paid to shareholders.   
Panel D: Deal characteristics  
Transaction value ($millions)  Transaction value refers to the total value of consideration paid by the acquirer in order to obtain the target. We report 
the total dollar value as reported by Thomson One.  
Premium (%)  Premium is defined as the offer price, as the log percentage difference from target's share price four weeks before the 
M&A deal announcement (Baker et al. 2012).  
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Relative deal size  Relative deal size is computed as the transaction value divided by the market capitalization of the acquirer, four weeks 
before the official deal announcement.  
Hostile takeover Dummy variable that equals 1 if the M&A deal is reported as hostile. 
Tender offer Dummy variable that equals 1 when the acquisition is reported as tender offer 
Toehold Dummy variable that equals 1 when bidder owns target shares before takeover transaction 
Competing bid Dummy variable that equals 1 if the M&A deal involves multiple bidders.  
Cash Dummy variable that equals 1 if the M&A deal is paid entirely by cash. 
Stock Dummy variable that equals 1 if the M&A deal is paid entirely by stocks. 
Diversification Dummy variable that equals 1 when the first two digits of acquirer SIC are different from the first two digits of target 
SIC. 
 
